

Ideology - Partisanship Alignment and Quality of Democracy: A Correlational Study

By Hengrui Zhu

Author Biography

Hengrui Zhu is a junior at BASIS International School Park Lane Harbour in Guangdong China. His interests include Philosophy, Ethics in Society, and Public Policy. Currently, he is studying moral methodology in meta-ethics and normative ethics, and, based on his study of why things matter, pursuing arguments in applied ethics in informing us of what we owe each other and therefore how we should live our lives.

Abstract

This paper identifies whether a correlation exists between the extent to which a democracy is programmatic and the quality of its democracy. In order to achieve the objective, the research will:

1. Develop an indicator for the Programmatic Score of democracies.
2. Assess if there exists a significant correlational relationship between the programmatic score of countries and their respective quality of democracy.

This paper devises the Programmatic Score of democracies as an indicator of the extent to which voters vote based on their ideology, instead of other factors such as socio- economic and racial status.

To achieve objective 1, the paper uses Wave 7 of the World Value Survey to determine the proportion of the voting population that votes for the party and the ideological composition of the voters of the party. To achieve objective 2, the paper determines the quality of democracy to be Freedom House's Freedom Score of the country, with countries rated 70 or above characterized as democracies.

Keywords: programmatic, ideology, voting, quality of democracy, economic incentive, issue-voting, non-economic issue, party representation, geographical clustering, multi-party

Ideology-Based Voting and Quality of Democracy: A Correlational Study

Although written records of partisanship, or political factions, can be dated back to Plato's mention of the political factions of Classical Athens in his *Republic*, modern political parties are considered to have emerged in late 18th century Europe (Conservative Party of the United Kingdom) and the United States of America (Democratic Party) that extended politics to the general public, where the concept of the electorate is conceived and civil democracies featuring more competition began.

By the early 19th century, Western European politics, in countries like Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, and France, began to be increasingly centered around parties divided by the liberal-conservative dichotomy, a phenomenon intensified by the 1848 revolutions. The early 20th century saw the emergence of the socialist party disrupt the ideology-dependent division of political parties in Europe.

There exists mainly two possible motivations for one to vote for a party — one's ideological standing matching that of the party's, or one being economically incentivized to vote for the party. For example, one's views on issues such as abortion and LGBTQ+ rights may align with a party's policies, causing one to, thus, vote for the party. On the contrary, one might vote for a party with policies on issues, such as abortion, that are opposite to one's views because the party provides him with economic incentives, such as preferable tax policies. The extent to which a country is programmatic is the extent to which the voters of the country vote based on ideology, which is not limited to non-economic issues. For example, a voter might ideologically support the government in helping the poor, while resent that the money is coming out of his bank account. In a scenario in which two countries have the same number of such voters, the country with more votes for the party that proposes government support policies would be considered more programmatic. In a world in which economic incentives always trump ideology, the democracy with better voter representation is hypothesized to be more programmatic. For example,

there exists democracy A and democracy B in world W, in which the only non-economic issue is the justifiability of abortion, and the only economic issue pertaining to ideology is the fairness of redistribution. In democracy A, there exists only two parties, Party A1 and Party A2. Party A1 is anti-abortion and anti-redistribution, while Party A2 is pro-abortion and pro-redistribution. If a voter is of relatively lower socio-economic status, the person would most likely be pro-redistribution (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017). Also assume that the person is anti-abortion. If the person is more programmatic than 0.5, he would more likely vote for Party A1. If the person is less programmatic than 0.5, he would more likely vote for party A2. This paper aims to investigate whether there exists a correlation between a democracy's Programmatic Score and its quality of democracy as the first step to a series of research to establish a causal relationship between a democracy's Programmatic Score and its quality of democracy and investigate whether it is the difference in extent of representation or qualitative differences between voters of different countries (e.g. voters of democracy A tend to vote based on ideology than voters of democracy B) that accounts for some countries having a higher programmatic score than others. If qualitative differences between voters of different countries are found to account for differences in Programmatic scores of countries, future research could set out to find the reason.

Literature Review

Research has established that higher socio-economic status is negatively correlated with (Andersen & Curtis, 2015; Brooks & Brady, 1999) support for redistribution. Interestingly, lottery winners were shown to be more hostile towards redistributive politics than non-lottery winners (Doherty et al., 2006). Research has also established that subjective socio-economic status causes differences in redistributive preferences and ideology, such as considering inequality as fair or unfair (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017). Research has found a lack of significant correlation between socio-economic status and non-economic issues, such as abortion (Spaeth & Powers, 1984).

The Left-Right labeling mechanism, since its inception after the French Revolution, has formed a code of communication between politicians, parties, media, and voters and served as an instrument to help voters understand the political realm as labels and guides to navigate and orient citizens through a mass of political messages and shaping attitudes and choices. This mostly occurred in countries where the establishment of democracy was not suspended by various forms of fascism and totalitarianism, including extra-European countries like Australia and Canada. Over time, the left and right have offered citizens of multiparty polities a compass either to organize their knowledge and locate themselves in a political arena made up of “us and them.” Stability and comprehensiveness have allowed “left” and “right” to serve as devices to simplify citizens’ choices and to affirm their political identity within and beyond the borders of national polities.

Time and the media have allowed “left” and “right” to take the features of stable postures towards politics that distinguish people one from another. Ultimately, “left” and “right” have become common heuristics across countries for tracing the manifold political offers of parties to more basic political views, and thus to summarize, distinguish, and compare the various political platforms of governments and of their oppositions. For example, one might first learn that certain policies, such as a high level of government intervention in the economy and a “pro-choice” stance on abortion, is categorized as “left”, which then helps him navigate through the stances of parties, simplified by the media as “left”, “right”, or “centrist”. One might also be socially primed to attribute normative values to these labels. For instance, the Black U.S. population, although no less ideologically diverse than other ethnicities, overwhelmingly vote democrats, many of whom normatively viewing the “left” as good and the “right” as bad (Dombroski, 2020).

Overall, there is little existing literature on the extent to which ideological voting relates to quality of democracy.

Methodology

This section presents the method with which the extent to which voters of a country vote based on ideology is determined.

Quality of Democracy and Analyzed Countries

This paper first determines the quality of democracy to be assessed with the Global Freedom Scores by Freedom House (or Freedom House Score), and only qualifies countries with a Freedom House Score of 70 or above as a democracy. A country will be analyzed if and only if it: 1) it has been rated with a Freedom House Score equal to or above 70 throughout 2017-2022 (the time-frame of Wave 7 of the World Values Survey) and 2) data of some of its parties’ economic-left-right scale is available on V-Dem.

Table 1
List of Analyzed Countries

Country	Freedom House Score	Country	Freedom House Score	Country	Freedom House Score
Sweden	100	Germany	94	Lithuania	89
Finland	100	Estonia	94	France	89
Norway	100	Taiwan	94	Latvia	88
New Zealand	99	Iceland	94	Greece	86
Canada	98	Chile	94	Argentina	85
Netherlands	97	Austria	93	Croatia	84
Denmark	97	United Kingdom	93	Mongolia	84
Switzerland	96	Cyprus	92	United States of America	83
Uruguay	96	Spain	90	Romania	83
Japan	96	Slovakia	90	South Korea	83
Portugal	96	Italy	90	Poland	81
Slovenia	95			Ghana	80
Australia	95			South Africa	79
				Brazil	72
				Colombia	70
				Ecuador	70

Programmatic Score

To capture the extent to which voters of a country vote based on ideology rather than other factors, the paper devises the concept of “Programmatic Score”, which can range from 0 (no votes are based on ideology) to 1 (all votes are based on ideology). A country’s Programmatic Score is the sum of the Programmatic Score of its parties; the formula for which is “Percentage of Programmatic Voters out of all voters” * “Percentage of voters of the

party over the total voting population”. The second half of the formula takes the size of the party into consideration (i.e., a country with a sizable party having a Programmatic Score of 0.9 and a miniature party having a Programmatic Score of 0.1 should have a higher Programmatic Score than a country with a miniature party having a Programmatic Score of 0.9 and a sizable party having a Programmatic Score of 0.1).

To determine the Programmatic Score of a party, this paper first determines its size, then determines the ideological position of the party on the left-right scale.

The size of the party is the percentage of voters of the party over the total voting population, calculated with the following procedure:

1. On World Values Survey, select wave, which, if the availability of V-Dem data permits (I.e., at the time of writing, the most up-to-date V-Dem data is 2018), would preferably be the most recent (which, at the time of writing, would be Wave 7 (2017-2022)). As “percentage of voters of the party over the total voting population” is wave-contingent, wave-switching will obscure accurate observation. Thus, it is advised to use the same wave for all parties in a country. If there are significant shifts in the ideological position of the party, it is advised to exclude the party from analysis.
2. Select country. The country must both have a Freedom House score of equal to or above 70 and Economic-Left-Right data of its parties must be available on V-Dem.
3. In “Survey Questions”, search “Which party would you vote for if there were a national election tomorrow” and click “Show”.

Figure 1
Response of Question Q223 — “Which party would you vote for if there were a national election tomorrow” on World Values Survey, Wave 7.

Q223.- Which party would you vote for if there were a national election tomorrow


Cross by
-- None selected --

	Number of cases	%/Total	Cumulative %
No right to vote	61	4.0%	4.0%
I would cast a blank ballot; White vote	204	13.4%	17.4%
COL: Colombian Conservative Party	112	7.4%	24.8%
COL: Colombian Liberal Party	211	13.9%	38.7%
COL: Social Party of National Unity	83	5.5%	44.1%
COL: Radical Change	44	2.9%	47.0%
COL: Partido Independiente de Renovación Absoluta	10	0.7%	47.7%
COL: Green Alliance	75	4.9%	52.6%
COL: Alternative Democratic Pole	56	3.7%	56.3%
COL: Progressive Movement (Colombia)	31	2.0%	58.4%
COL: Democratic Center Party	179	11.8%	70.1%
No answer	454	29.9%	100.0%
(N)	(1,520)	100%	

Selected sample: Colombia 2018 (1520)

4. Because the Programmatic Score concerns only the extent to which voters vote based on ideology, only voters should be considered, and thus responses with “No right to vote”, “I would cast blank ballot; White vote”, and “No answer” should be eliminated, thus changing the number of total responses (N).

Figure 2
List of Parties of Colombia on V-Dem



Furthermore, only include parties that have data available on both World Values Survey and V-Dem. In the case of Colombia, for example, the Colombian Conservative Party will be analyzed, while the Progressive movement will not.

Figure 3
Side-by-side: World Values Survey data before and after excluding non-voters and parties without available data

Base=1520; Weighted results	Number of cases	% of Population
No right to vote	61	4%
I would cast a blank ballot; White vote	204	13.40%
COL: Colombian Conservative Party	112	7.40%
COL: Colombian Liberal Party	211	13.90%
COL: Social Party of National Unity	83	5.50%
COL: Radical Change	44	2.90%
COL: Partido Independiente de Renovación Absoluta	10	0.70%
COL: Green Alliance	75	4.90%
COL: Alternative Democratic Pole	56	3.70%
COL: Progressive Movement (Colombia)	31	2%
COL: Democratic Center Party	179	11.80%
No answer	454	29.90%
Total: 1520	Total: 100%	

	Number of cases	% of Population
COL: Colombian Conservative Party	112	7.40%
COL: Colombian Liberal Party	211	13.90%
COL: Social Party of National Unity	83	5.50%
COL: Radical Change	44	2.90%
COL: Green Alliance	75	4.90%
COL: Alternative Democratic Pole	56	3.70%
COL: Democratic Center Party	179	11.80%
Total: 760	Total: 50.1%	

To determine Recalculated %Total of each party, divide the party's Number of cases by the Recalculated (N). The cumulative % should remain 100%.

Table 2
Recalculated (Valid) Percentages of the Voting Population who votes for analyzed Colombian parties

	Number of cases	% of Population	Valid % of Population
COL: Colombian Conservative Party	112	7.40%	14.77%
COL: Colombian Liberal Party	211	13.90%	27.74%
COL: Social Party of National Unity	83	5.50%	10.98%
COL: Radical Change	44	2.90%	5.79%
COL: Green Alliance	75	4.90%	9.78%
COL: Alternative Democratic Pole	56	3.70%	7.39%
COL: Democratic Center Party	179	11.80%	23.55%
	Total: 760	Total: 50.1%	Total: 100%

After determining the size of the party, the paper now determines the ideological composition of the voters of a party by the following procedures.

On World Values Survey, cross "Which party would you vote for if there were a national election tomorrow" with "Left-Right political scale" and select "Show Row% (exclude DK/NA)". This paper categorizes voters who identify with 1-2 as left, 3-4 as center-left, 5-6 as center, 7-8 as center-right, and 9-10 as right.

Table 3
Raw response of "Which party would you vote for if there were a national election tomorrow" crossed with "Left-Right Political Scale" for Colombia on World Values Survey, Wave 7

World Values Survey Wave 7: 2017-2022												
Which party would you vote for if there were a national election tomorrow												
	Left	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Right		
No right to vote	61	24.6	1.6	6.6	1.6	36.1	9.9	0	10.9	3.1	4.9	
I would cast a blank ballot. While vote	204	10.3	1	3.4	3.4	43.4	11.3	4.4	3.4	1	10.1	
COL: Colombian Conservative Party	112	7.1	0	2.7	2.7	17.9	8	4.9	10.7	5.4	41.1	
COL: Colombian Liberal Party	211	8.8	1.9	2.4	1.9	19.4	9.4	7.2	5.2	1.4	41.7	
COL: Social Party of National Unity	83	6	0	3.6	15.7	6.4	7.2	4.9	4.9	43.4		
COL: Radical Change	44	11.4	2.3	3.3	0	31.8	4.5	6.1	6.8	2.3	29.5	
COL: Partido Independiente de	10	0	0	0	0	60	10	0	0	0	30	
Revolucion Alternativa	75	20	0	6.7	8	37.3	8	5.3	4	2.7	8	
COL: Green Alliance	75	20	0	6.7	8	37.3	8	5.3	4	2.7	8	
COL: Alternative Democratic Pole	56	21.1	1.8	9.9	1.8	29.8	3.4	5.4	1.9	0	6.9	
COL: Progressive Movement	31	48.4	3.2	9.7	9.7	19.4	6.5	0	3.2	0	0	
Colombia	179	9	1.7	1.7	2.2	21.8	9.9	6.1	6.1	5	38.1	
PN	1984	12.6	1.2	3.4	3	27.6	4.4	6.4	6	2.7	34.7	

Table 4
Analyzed response of "Which party would you vote for if there were a national election tomorrow" crossed with "Left-Right Political Scale" for Colombia on World Values Survey, Wave 7, highlighted in green

World Values Survey Wave 7: 2017-2022												
Which party would you vote for if there were a national election tomorrow												
	Left	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Right		
No right to vote	61	24.6	1.6	6.6	1.6	36.1	9.9	0	10.9	3.1	4.9	
I would cast a blank ballot. While vote	204	10.3	1	3.4	3.4	43.4	11.3	4.4	3.4	1	10.1	
COL: Colombian Conservative Party	112	7.1	0	2.7	2.7	17.9	8	4.9	10.7	5.4	41.1	
COL: Colombian Liberal Party	211	8.8	1.9	2.4	1.9	19.4	9.4	7.2	5.2	1.4	41.7	
COL: Social Party of National Unity	83	6	0	3.6	15.7	6.4	7.2	4.9	4.9	43.4		
COL: Radical Change	44	11.4	2.3	3.3	0	31.8	4.5	6.1	6.8	2.3	29.5	
COL: Partido Independiente de	10	0	0	0	0	60	10	0	0	0	30	
Revolucion Alternativa	75	20	0	6.7	8	37.3	8	5.3	4	2.7	8	
COL: Green Alliance	75	20	0	6.7	8	37.3	8	5.3	4	2.7	8	
COL: Alternative Democratic Pole	56	21.1	1.8	9.9	1.8	29.8	3.4	5.4	1.9	0	6.9	
COL: Progressive Movement	31	48.4	3.2	9.7	9.7	19.4	6.5	0	3.2	0	0	
COL: Democratic Center Party	179	9	1.7	1.7	2.2	21.8	9.9	6.1	6.1	5	38.1	
PN	1984	12.6	1.2	3.4	3	27.6	4.4	6.4	6	2.7	34.7	

After determining the ideological stance of the voters of the party, determine the ideological stance of the party. There are no indicators that classify a party's ideological position specific to issue. For example, if Party A proposes a high level of state intervention in the economy, and Party B proposes highly progressive taxation, there are no indicators that can tell them apart ideologically, which is why the left-right scale has been historically prominent as a compass of political navigation.

The idea of the Programmatic Score, or PS, is that, if a voter identifies to be on the left of the scale, and if the party is on the left of the scale, then the voter would be programmatic if he votes for the party or other parties on the left of the scale. An objection to this method would be to say that the voter is programmatic only if he votes for the party that he CONSIDERS to be on the left. But the merit to abandoning the subjective identification is that it reflects that some countries might be more programmatic because the parties are more ideologically distinct or clear to the voter, and thus improving the accuracy of identification.

The main drawback of only having an economic-left-right indicator is that it identifies some programmatic voters as non-programmatic. For instance, in Germany, if Thomas is economically conservative and socially liberal, which aligns with the policy of the Free Democratic Party, he would most likely place himself as a centrist. While the FDP would be characterized by V-Dem as rightist. Thomas should be considered programmatic if he votes for the FDP, but would not be, with this paper's methodology. V-Dem characterizes a party on a scale of 0 (left) - 6 (right), assigning, for example, the Colombian Conservative Party a score of 4.854, while World Values Survey characterizes a party on a scale of 1-10.

Convert V-Dem scores to the World Values Survey scale by performing $1 + 3/2 * \text{V-Dem Score} = \text{Left-Right Score of the party}$. For instance, to determine whether the Colombian Conservative Party is on the left, center, or right, multiply $4.854 * 3/2 + 1$ to convert the V-Dem six-point scale to the World Values Survey ten-point scale, which equals to 8.281, which this paper considers center-right for being closer to 8 than to 9.

Table 5

Ideological Positions of, Percentages of Population Who Votes For, and Ideological Positions of Voters Of parties of Colombia

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS Scale (V-Dem*3/2+1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right
Colombian Conservative Party	Center - Right 8.281	14.77%	7.2%	6.4%	31.7%	24.6%	30.1%
Colombian Liberal Party	Center-Left 4.9105	27.74%	6.5%	7.2%	30.5%	25.8%	30.3%
Social Party of National Unity	Center-Left 6.07	10.98%	6.7%	4.8%	39.9%	21.2%	27.4%
Radical Change	Center-Right 7.590	5.79%	5.6%	11.2%	55.6%	11.1%	16.7%
Green Alliance	Center 4.5535	9.78%	2.8%	16.7%	50%	11.1%	19.5%
Alternative Democratic Pole	Center-Left 2.668	7.39%	20%	17.8%	44.5%	6.6%	11.1%
Democratic Centre	Right 8.5795	23.55%	6.7%	3.9%	30.7%	14.5%	44.1%
			1-2	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10

After determining the ideological stance of the voters of the party and the ideological stance of the party, determine the extent to which the voters of a party are programmatic. This paper defines the programmatic ideological composition of voters of a party as the two positions closest to the categorized ideological position of the party. For example, voters who identify as center and center-right of a party with a V-Dem economic-left -right score of 6.5 would be considered programmatic voters of the party, while the rest are considered non- programmatic.

Table 6

In blue, Percentage Of Programmatic Voters Out of Total Voters of Party for every analyzed party of Colombia

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS Scale (V-Dem*3/2+1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right
Colombian Conservative Party	Center - Right 8.281	14.77%	7.2%	6.4%	31.7%	24.6%	30.1%
Colombian Liberal Party	Center 5.032	27.74%	6.5%	7.2%	30.5%	25.8%	30.3%
Social Party of National Unity	Center 6.223	10.98%	6.7%	4.8%	39.9%	21.2%	27.4%
Radical Change	Center-Right 7.4835	5.79%	5.6%	11.2%	55.6%	11.1%	16.7%
Green Alliance	Center 4.5535	9.78%	2.8%	16.7%	50%	11.1%	19.5%
Alternative Democratic Pole	Center-Left 2.668	7.39%	20%	17.8%	44.5%	6.6%	11.1%
Democratic Centre	Right 8.5795	23.55%	6.7%	3.9%	30.7%	14.5%	44.1%
			1-2	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10

The Programmatic Score of a party is then calculated by multiplying the “Percentage of the Voting Population who votes for the Party” with the “Percentage of Programmatic Voters out of all the

voters of the Party”. The Programmatic Score of the democracy is the sum of the Programmatic Score of each of its parties.

Table 7.1

Programmatic Scores of parties of Colombia and Colombia

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS Scale (V-Dem*3/2+1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Programmatic Score
Colombian Conservative Party	Center - Right 8.281	14.77%	7.2%	6.4%	31.7%	24.6%	30.1%	0.081
Colombian Liberal Party	Center 5.032	27.74%	6.5%	7.2%	30.5%	25.8%	30.3%	0.1046
Social Party of National Unity	Center 6.223	10.98%	6.7%	4.8%	39.9%	21.2%	27.4%	0.0971
Radical Change	Center-Right 7.4835	5.79%	5.6%	11.2%	55.6%	11.1%	16.7%	0.039
Green Alliance	Center 4.5535	9.78%	2.8%	16.7%	50%	11.1%	19.5%	0.065
Alternative Democratic Pole	Center-Left 2.668	7.39%	20%	17.8%	44.5%	6.6%	11.1%	0.0279
Democratic Centre	Right 8.5795	23.55%	6.7%	3.9%	30.7%	14.5%	44.1%	0.138
			1-2	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10	Cumulative: 0.52

The Colombian Conservative Party is characterized as center-right and has a Programmatic Score of 0.081. The Colombian Liberal Party is characterized as center and has a Programmatic Score of 0.1046. The Social Party of National Unity is characterized as center and has a Programmatic Score of 0.0671. Radical Change is characterized as Center- Right and has a Programmatic Score of 0.039. Green Alliance is characterized as center and has a Programmatic Score of 0.065. Alternative Democratic Pole is characterized as Center- Left and has a Programmatic Score of 0.0279. Democratic Centre is characterized as right and has a Programmatic Score of 0.138. Colombia has a Programmatic Score of 0.52.

Results

The analyzed parties, their respective V-Dem characterization, the percentage of the voting population that votes for the party, the ideological standings of the voters of the parties, and the Programmatic Score, of each of the 40 countries are as follow:

Table 7.2

Programmatic Scores of analyzed Parties of Argentina and Argentina

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS Scale (V-Dem*3/2+1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Programmatic Score
ARG: Citizen's Unity, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	3.3265	38.85%	9.8%	27%	40.1%	14.2%	9%	0.014
ARG: Justicial (Peronist) Party, Daniel Scioli	4.852	2.35%	7.3%	4.3%	51.5%	36.8%	0%	0.013113
ARG: Front for Victory	3.3265	20.08%	2.8%	9.2%	51.3%	21.9%	14.8%	0.12148
ARG: Republican Proposal, María Eugenia Vidal	7.273	10.95%	1.5%	9.2%	43.3%	28.9%	17.2%	0.07905
			1-2	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10	Cumulative: 0.32

Table 7.32
Programmatic Scores of analyzed Parties of South Korea and South Korea

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS (N-Dem/3/2=1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Programmatic Score
KOR: Liberty Korea Party - Grand National Party	1.8225	49.11%	3.9%	13.8%	35.4%	33.4%	13.4%	0.087
KOR: Democratic Party	1.221	38.29%	11.4%	33.1%	36.2%	15.9%	3.5%	0.1733
KOR: Advancement Unification Party - Liberty Forward Party	1.607	5.04%	11.1%	27.2%	29.2%	25.3%	7.1%	0.019332
KOR: Korean Labor Party	1.0875	7.56%	16.1%	36.7%	35.9%	7.5%	3.9%	0.0399
								Cumulative: 0.317

Table 7.33
Programmatic Scores of analyzed Parties of New Zealand and New Zealand

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS (N-Dem/3/2=1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Programmatic Score
NZL: ACT New Zealand	8.31	2.00				50	35.7	0.01714
NZL: Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand	2.71	9.13	31.2	48.4				0.0727
NZL: New Zealand Labour Party	4.32	43.37		43.8	32.2			0.3296
NZL: New Zealand National Party	6.96	43.37			25.6	48		0.3182
NZL: New Zealand First Party	5.19	2.14		6.7	66.6			0.01569
			1.2	3.4	5.4	7.8	9-10	Cumulative: 0.74

Table 7.34
Programmatic Scores of analyzed Parties of South Africa and South Africa

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS (N-Dem/3/2=1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Programmatic Score
ZAF: African National Congress	Center-Left 3.885	74.40%	4.3%	11.1%	33.8%	36.1%	14.7%	0.534
ZAF: Democratic Alliance	Center-Right 6.784	18.07%	10.5%	11.7%	46.6%	21.9%	9.2%	0.124
ZAF: Inkatha Freedom Party	Center-Right 6.589	1.00%	0%	0%	41.9%	54.1%	4%	0.0096
ZAF: Economic Freedom Fighters	Left 1.564	2.13%	0%	9.2%	50.7%	26.7%	13.5%	0.0003
ZAF: Congress of the People	Center 4.753	0.88%	4.9%	4.4%	39.9%	36.8%	11.9%	0.003864
			1-2	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10	Cumulative: 0.4734

Table 7.35
Programmatic Scores of analyzed Parties of Italy and Italy

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS (N-Dem/3/2=1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Programmatic Score
ITA: Go Italy	7.4725	12.67%	0.7%	0%	19.8%	57.5%	21.9%	0.101
ITA: North League	8.489	25.74%	1.1%	2.7%	15.7%	52.6%	28%	0.2075
ITA: Democratic Party	4.3875	26.23%	18.4%	41.3%	32.7%	4.9%	2.7%	0.1941
ITA: Union of the Centre	5.917	1.081%	0%	14.9%	44.9%	40.2%	0%	0.0093
ITA: Five Star Movement	6.0535	29.86%	5.7%	17.3%	44.5%	26.1%	6.5%	0.2108
ITA: The People of Italy	7.4375	0.4912%	0	0	80.7%	19.3%	0	0.004912
ITA: Brothers of Italy	8.221	3.39%	0	0	21.2%	50.6%	28.3%	0.031
								Cumulative: 0.76

Table 7.36
Programmatic Scores of analyzed Parties of UK-Great Britain and UK-Great Britain

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS (N-Dem/3/2=1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Programmatic Score
GBR: Conservative and Unionist Party	7.957	38.25%	1.4%	4.4%	36.6%	44.2%	11.4%	0.21267
GBR: Labour Party	2.536	46.41%	15.4%	33.9%	41.2%	7.4%	2.1%	0.2298
GBR: Liberal Democrat	5.1835	10.55%	1.6%	31.6%	59.5%	6.7%	0.5%	0.0961105
GBR: Independence Party	8.449	4.7815%	0%	10.3%	63.7%	22.3%	3.7%	0.0124519
								Cumulative: 0.55

Table 7.37
Programmatic Scores of analyzed Parties of the United States of America and the United States of America

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS (N-Dem/3/2=1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Programmatic Score
USA: Republican Party	7.758	43.58%	2.3%	5.8%	29.8%	34.9%	27.3%	0.271
USA: Democratic Party	4.324	56.42%	24.5%	32.1%	33.5%	6.8%	3%	0.383
			0-2	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10	Cumulative: 0.65

Table 7.38
Programmatic Scores of analyzed Parties of the Netherlands and the Netherlands

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS (N-Dem/3/2=1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Programmatic Score
NLD: Christian Democratic Appeal	6.904	6.65	0	9.5	42.8	44.4	3.2	0.058
NLD: People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	7.417	28.69			25	61.4		0.248
NLD: Democrats 66	5.610	19.83		47.4	32.5			0.158
NLD: Party for Freedom	7.4725	11.50			33	38.5		0.082
NLD: Green Left	3.52	10.97	33.7	56.8				0.098
NLD: Socialist Party	1.993	9.49	26.7	48.9				0.072
NLD: Labour Party	4.45	12.87		56.7	23.8			0.102
			1-2	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10	Cumulative: 0.82

Table 7.39
Programmatic Scores of analyzed Parties of Norway and the Norway

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS (N-Dem/3/2=1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Programmatic Score
NLD: Christian Democratic Appeal	6.904	6.65	0	9.5	42.8	44.4	3.2	0.058
NLD: People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	7.417	28.69			25	61.4		0.248
NLD: Democrats 66	5.610	19.83		47.4	32.5			0.158
NLD: Party for Freedom	7.4725	11.50			33	38.5		0.082
NLD: Green Left	3.52	10.97	33.7	56.8				0.098
NLD: Socialist Party	1.993	9.49	26.7	48.9				0.072
NLD: Labour Party	4.45	12.87		56.7	23.8			0.102
			1-2	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10	Cumulative: 0.82

Table 7.40
Programmatic Scores of analyzed Parties of Sweden and the Sweden

Parties	V-Dem Characterization Converted to WVS (N-Dem/3/2=1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Programmatic Score
NLD: Christian Democratic Appeal	6.904	6.65	0	9.5	42.8	44.4	3.2	0.058
NLD: People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	7.417	28.69			25	61.4		0.248
NLD: Democrats 66	5.610	19.83		47.4	32.5			0.158
NLD: Party for Freedom	7.4725	11.50			33	38.5		0.082
NLD: Green Left	3.52	10.97	33.7	56.8				0.098
NLD: Socialist Party	1.993	9.49	26.7	48.9				0.072
NLD: Labour Party	4.45	12.87		56.7	23.8			0.102
			1-2	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10	Cumulative: 0.82

Analysis

Overall, there exists a strong, positive correlation between a democracy's Programmatic Score and its quality of democracy.

Figure 4
Statistical Analysis on Freedom House Score and Programmatic Score

<u>corr ProgrammaticScore FreedomHouseScore</u> (obs=40)			
	<u>ProgrammaticScore</u>	<u>FreedomHouseScore</u>	
<u>ProgrammaticScore</u>	1.0000		
<u>FreedomHouseScore</u>	0.6921	1.0000	

. regress FreedomHouseScore ProgrammaticScore			
Source	SS	df	MS
Model	1211.02516	1	1211.02516
Residual	1316.94984	38	34.6565747
Total	2527.975	39	64.8198718

				Number of obs	=	40
				F(1, 38)	=	34.94
				Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.4790
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4653
				Root MSE	=	5.887

FreedomHouseScore	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]
ProgrammaticScore	36.24983	6.132283	5.91	0.000	23.83567 48.66398
_cons	66.3348	4.064864	16.32	0.000	58.10591 74.56369

The null hypothesis is rejected ($p < 0.001$), and the correlation is therefore statistically significant. Every 1 point increase in the Programmatic score corresponds with a 0.69 increase in the Freedom House score and predicts a 0.36 increase in Freedom House score.

Figure 5
Lowess Smoother of Scatterplot of Freedom House Score (y-axis) vs. Programmatic Score (x-axis)




Figure 6
Map of Europe, color-coded by memberships in alliances



Democracies within a certain range of Programmatic Scores tend to cluster — Spain and Portugal with the highest scores (86, 84), followed by the three Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway, and Finland (80, 79, 78), then the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria (82, 82, 79), then Switzerland and France (66, 66), then Latvia and Lithuania (69, 63), then, Slovakia, Romania, Poland, and Croatia (62, 59, 53, 52). Asian countries and regions, i.e., Japan, Mongolia, Taiwan, and South Korea (61, 59, 52, 32) tend to receive lower programmatic scores despite being rated disproportionately higher on Freedom House Score. Except for Chile (80), South American, as well as African countries, tend to score lower than European countries, none of which with scores above 55.

Conclusions

There exists a strong, positive correlation between the Programmatic Score of democracies and their respective quality of governance — that is, democracies in which the voter votes based on their ideology, or, as an alternative explanation, democracies with more comprehensive representation of the voters' ideology without compromising

economic incentives, are more likely to be better in terms of personal autonomy (e.g. restrictions to foreign travel), individual and organizational rights (e.g. freedom of expression and belief, and peaceful protest), political rights (e.g. safeguards against corruption), rule of law (e.g. due process in civil and criminal matters), pluralism and participation (e.g. freedom from undue obstacles to the rise and fall of parties), electoral process (e.g. free and fair elections), and government functioning (e.g. the extent to which freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government) than democracies in which the voter's ideology does not significantly influence their voting decision, or democracies with less comprehensive representation.

Limitations and Future Scope

Methodologically, this paper is limited in that the paper employs the democracy's Freedom House Score as the only indicator of quality of democracy. The sole indicator of a party's left-right position is economic and is sourced only from V-Dem reports that do not necessarily reflect fluctuations during the 5-year period delineated by World Value Survey reports. For example, V-Dem may only provide data of a party's left-right position in 2018 in a country, which is surveyed in 2019 by World Values Survey, and thus may ultimately be insufficient in the timeliness of the data. Furthermore, World Value Survey's sample size can arguably be limited, as the question employed by the paper mostly samples less than ten thousand people, often with data of some parties' voters' ideological composition with a sample of less than ten people. The paper also does not account for the tendency of the surveyed to regard 5 (when asked on a scale of 1-10), as the center, a perception that would potentially skew the ideological composition of voters of a party to the left. There are methods that factors both the economic and the social in determining a party's position, but they require manual data gathering and computation for each specific party, which was not feasible given the time frame, but is a viable option for future studies.


Additionally, the paper does not conduct mathematical data analysis to determine the Programmatic score with models that would capture the deviation of the composition of the voters'

ideology from the ideal composition more accurately than manual calculation that accounts only for proximity and does not factor in the extent of deviation in the programmatic score. For example, for a party that has been rated by V-Dem with a 6.789 to be rated with a Programmatic Score of 100, 100% of the Party's voters would need to identify as center or center-right. The methodology of this paper, however, will rate such a party with 50% of its voters being Centrists and the rest being Far-Lefts or Far-Rights (not to mention that the two groups are treated the same) with the same programmatic score with such a party with 50% of its voters being Centrists, and the rest being center-lefts. In other words, not only were different levels of deviation from the ideal ideological composition of voters of a party not mathematically modeled, they were not weighted except for the number of categories allowed being two instead of one. Future studies could weigh deviations by numerically considering different deviations as impacting the Programmatic Score differently. For example, for a centrist party, calculate its Programmatic Score by the formula $1 - \text{"deductions from deviation"}$. A vote from a far-left or far-right voter would be weighed as 1, while a vote from a center-left or center-right voter would be weighed as 0.5. The exact numerical values in weighing can be modeled similarly to that of a logistic function.

This paper does not investigate the potential impacts the wording of the World Values Survey has on the responses of the surveyed. For example, instead of "Progressive" and "Conservative" or "Liberal" and "Conservative", World Values Survey instead uses the terms "Left" and "Right". In countries like Australia, Chile, Germany, Italy, and Spain, left-right ideological self-placement predicted voting better than the liberal-conservative self-placement, while the reverse occurred in the United States and in Poland (Caprara & Vecchione, 2018).

This paper does not address whether the subjective self-identification on the political left-right scale accurately reflects the voter's objective ideological position.

Figure 8
Possibly Differing Concepts of “Left” and “Right” of a Voter of Germany



The concepts of “left” and “right” differ significantly by individual. Unlike the accuracy and clarity of a party’s policies, a lack of standard in identifying oneself as left or right does not entail the country being less programmatic. For example, depending on Peter’s definition of “left” and “right”, the exact same behavior can be classified as programmatic or non-programmatic.

This paper cannot escape the problem of score inconsistencies between different years of Freedom House reports due to changes in methodology, and thus obstructs valid comparison. The paper is limited also in that the sample size of democracies with lower Freedom House scores may be argued insignificant, for there are only four countries with a Freedom House score from 79 to 70 and with a V-Dem Economic Left-Right score.

The paper does not address the problem that a political left-right scale may not capture the differences in policies between parties, and thus may falsely attribute redundancy to a democracy. For example, this paper will identify that Party A and Party B in Country C are both be rated with an economic left-right score of 2 by V-Dem, but cannot address that Party A will implement highly progressive taxation, while Party B will implement highly subsidized healthcare. Although both are rated as equally progressive, the Centrist, or even the Conservative voter, would be more inclined to vote for Party B, and thus resulting in Party B having a lower Programmatic Score than Party A, not to mention that the social-ideological standing of the party is completely ignored, which, if graded on a scale of 1-10, would still face the same problem that numbers do not capture policies. Furthermore, the methodology of this paper also allows no spill-overs. For instance, Party A and B were rated by V-Dem to both have an economic left-right score of 1. Party A has more progressive voters than Party B (with 2000 progressive voters and 1000

centrists, and 500 conservatives), but the latter (with 1000 voters, all progressive) may still have a higher Programmatic Score than Party A, despite the fact that all progressive voters voted either for Party A or Party B. The methodology also generalizes party positions from 5-significant-digits scores provided by V-Dem into the categories of “Left”, “Center-Left”, “Center”, “Center-Right”, and “Right”, the boundaries between which can be argued to be arbitrary.

Future studies could, based on analysis of factors such as political polarization, number of effective parties, and governmental constitution, establish the main factors behind the formation of clear party identities and distinctions, such as the cause of a lack of redundancy in ideology of parties in a democracy. Studies could also investigate whether factors such as the flexibility of parties in switching ideologies, socio-economic level of development of a democracy, and the elimination of socio-economic incentives in affiliation with parties are prerequisites to ideology-based voting. Future studies may also expound on reasons behind a potential causal relationship between Programmatic Score and Quality of Democracy. For example, does ideology-based voting increase political stability, participation, and representation? Do voters prefer ideology-based voting over socio-economic-based voting?

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Appendix A

Why some countries are more programmatic than others: three theories

Table 8
Freedom House Score, Programmatic Score, Worldwide Wealth Inequality Ranking, Gini coefficient of analyzed countries

Country (Freedom House Score)	Freedom House Score	Programmatic Score	Wealth Inequality Ranking	Gini Coefficient
Sweden	100	0.80	165	27.6
Finland	100	0.79	156	26.8
Norway	100	0.78	167	25
New Zealand	99	0.74	142	36.2
Canada	98	0.66	112	33.3
Netherlands	97	0.82	159	29.2
Denmark	97	0.73	154	27.7
Switzerland	96	0.66	162	33.1
Uruguay	96	0.48	58	40.2
Japan	96	0.61	116	32.9
Portugal	96	0.84	143	32.8
Slovenia	95	0.78	164	24.4
Australia	95	0.75	107	34.3
Germany	94	0.82	126	31.7
Estonia	94	0.77	132	30.8
Taiwan	94	0.52	111	33.6
Iceland	94	0.74	155	26.1
Chile	94	0.8	29	44.9
Austria	93	0.79	158	30.2
United Kingdom	93	0.55	94	35.1
Cyprus	92	0.69	129	31.2
Spain	90	0.86	153	34.3
Slovakia	90	0.62	166	23.2
Italy	90	0.76	150	35.2
Lithuania	89	0.63	128	35.3
France	89	0.75	163	32.4
Latvia	88	0.69	127	34.5
Greece	86	0.81	152	33.1
Argentina	85	0.36	41	42.3
Croatia	84	0.52	134	28.9
Mongolia	84	0.59	120	32.7
United States of America	83	0.54	47	41.5
Romania	83	0.59	100	34.8
South Korea	83	0.32	128	31.4
Poland	81	0.53	137	30.2
Ghana	80	0.43	36	43.5
South Africa	79	0.47	1	63
Brazil	72	0.36	17	48.9
Colombia	70	0.39	7	54.2
Ecuador	70	0.53	106	47.3

Figure 7
Statistical Analysis of Programmatic Score and Wealth Inequality

```
. corr ProgrammaticScore WealthInequality
(obs=40)
```

	ProgrammaticScore	WealthInequality
ProgrammaticScore	1.0000	
WealthInequality	0.6625	1.0000


```
. corr ProgrammaticScore GINI
(obs=40)
```

	ProgrammaticScore	GINI
ProgrammaticScore	1.0000	
GINI	-0.5371	1.0000

There exists a negative correlation between a country's Programmatic Score and its wealth inequality. In a country of higher wealth equality, one is less likely to aspire to be wealthier than others than in a country of higher wealth inequality (Côté et al., 2015). Thus, in a country of higher wealth equality, one is more likely to vote based on ideology instead of economic incentive. For instance, the reason why one votes for a party with progressive policies in a country of higher wealth equality is more likely ideological than economically incentivized.

This paper anticipates two other theories as to why some countries are more programmatic than others: culture and representation. The culture theory states that it seems conceivable that the typical American would view material possession as an effective approach to happiness more than the typical Scandinavian, and thus might be more influenced by economic incentives when voting. Pressure to conform to social norms is also likely higher in the US than in places like Germany. For instance, while 87% of Black voters identify as Democrats in the United States, only 29% of Black democrats identify as liberals. In a survey by the American National Election Study in 2012, when asked about which party they identify with, Black respondents were more likely to report they were a Democrat when they were with a black interviewer (96.4%) than a nonblack interviewer (83.9%) or an online survey (85%). The representation theory states that voters of some countries don't inherently vote based on ideology more than voters of other countries. Instead, some countries are programmatic than others because they are either more comprehensive in representation, or provide no meaningful, economically incentivizing alternatives.

Suppose there exists democracies A, B, and C in world W, in which the only non- economic issue is abortion, and the only economic issue is redistribution. In democracy A, there exists only two parties: A1 is anti-abortion and anti-redistribution, A2 is pro-abortion and pro-redistribution. In democracy B, there exists four parties: B1 is anti-abortion and anti- redistribution, B2 is anti-abortion and pro-redistribution, B3 is pro-abortion and anti- redistribution, while B4 is pro-abortion and pro-redistribution. In democracy C, there exists two parties: C1 is pro-abortion, anti-redistribution, C2 is anti-abortion and anti-redistribution.

Jack is anti-abortion and has a PS of 0.5. Jack is of relatively lower socio-economic status, thus he would most likely be pro-redistribution. If Jack lives in democracy A, Jack would vote for A1 half of the time, and A2 half the time. Living in democracy B, he would vote for B4 100% of the time. Living in Democracy C, he would vote for C2 100% of the time. Although Jack maintains his PS, democracies B and C are more programmatic than A because they either have more comprehensive representation or provide no competing alternatives for the voter.

Table 9
Analyzed parties of Sweden, color-coded by ideological proximity

Parties	V Dom Characterization Translated to World Values Survey (2014-Demo 1)	Valid Percentage of Population who Votes for the Party	Left	Center-Left	Center	Center-Right	Right	Programmatic Score
Center Party (6.5%)	Center - Right	3.26%	0%	0%	42.2%	33.8%	23.9%	0.004776
Fascist People's Party of Sweden	Center-Right (6.9%)	6.52%	0%	4.3%	42.1%	51.1%	2.6%	0.061
The Christian Democrats	Center-Right (7.6%)	2.55%	9.9%	0%	24.1%	51.4%	14.7%	0.017
The Green Party	Center (4.9%)	13.75%	12.3%	49%	28.6%	5.9%	4.2%	0.1067
Moderate Party	Center-Right (8.2%)	33.30%	1.4%	1.5%	12.7%	55.5%	28.9%	0.281
Swedish Social Democratic Party	Center-Left (4.0%)	29.23%	18.7%	50.1%	24.6%	5.2%	1.3%	0.218
The Left Party	Center-Left (3.0%)	6.90%	58.6%	33.3%	6.3%	1.6%	0%	0.004
Sweden Democrats	Center-Right (7.3%)	4.48%	2%	13%	50.8%	6.8%	26.4%	0.026
			1-2	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10 Cumulative: 79.6%	

The high Programmatic Score of Sweden, for instance, might be explained by its comprehensive representation of diverse ideologies on non-economic issues by parties of ideological proximity on economic issues. For example, it is possible that while the Christian Democrats and the Sweden Democrats are both economically conservative, the former is socially conservative and the latter is economically liberal. A relatively affluent voter is more likely anti-redistribution, and thus would most likely choose the non-economic-ideology- fitting party between the Christian Democrats or the Sweden Democrats.